Civil infrastructure heavily damaged:

• Electrical power generation and distribution are disrupted
• Water and food distribution are severely limited
• Local government and law enforcement are severely limited
• Communication networks exist but are severely fragmented
• International communications gateways are destroyed
• Medical emergencies include injuries and diseas

• Standard circuit and data services (e.g. IP networks, SS7, GSM, etc)
• System management and control centers in operation
• Circuit damage impacts orderwire capability
• Public networks do not have precedence/preemption capability

Support requested through the UN.  NATO, AUSCANZUKUS, and nonaligned nations in Europe respond with a combination of military and non-military assistance.  Combined task force organized by UN.  European Union assigned command responsibility.  Host nation retains role as political and command and control authority in their territory. 

Principal objectives are to restore critical infrastructure and services as quickly as possible; to provide medical and logistic support; to reestablish host nation governmental authority and services, including law enforcement and public safety. 

Participating organizations:

• Combined task force comprising maritime elements from several nations.  US Navy provides afloat air operational capability and amphibious landing and logistic support .
• Doctors Without Borders (Medicines San Frontieres) in charge of medical support. US hospital ship assists
• Red Cross provides assistance with food, shelter, clothing.  NATO forces assist in transportation and logistics

Information Technology Challenges:

• Coalition information network for users with various levels of access permission and with varying technology capabilities
• Virtual command post with principal staff distributed in several locations
• Services required for users on the move: including stressing needs for imagery and telemedicine to several locations
• Unreliable network topology; constantly changing as situation changes
• Overall network management and system control under the authority of the host nation and EU, but most technical capability provided by US and NATO forces
• Local population has significant communications capability, often producing interference with critical relief services
• Flow of vital services requires close coordination and near real time information sharing among air traffic control, surface transport control, port authorities, customs, immigration, and other host nation agencies that may be augmented by supporting military organizations
• Competition with international news media for available communications

1.2 Natural Disaster in a Non-Urban Environment - Permissive Operational Situation 

Severe earthquake damage 200 km inland, in mountainous region remote from urban center.  Ground transportation to area severely limited due to destruction of bridges and tunnels.  No civil infrastructure remaining in affected area. 

Same objectives and participants as in 3.1.1.

 Information Technology Challenges:

• Coalition information network for users with various levels of access permission and with varying technology capabilities
• Virtual command post with majority of staff centered in urban area with extension to other principal staff based forward in the remote area
• Relief force must establish wideband network extension into remote area, with services for users on the move: including stressing needs for imagery and telemedicine to several locations
• Unreliable network topology; constantly changing as situation changes
• Overall network management and system control split into two distinct domains: SYSCON for systems and services in the urban area are under the authority of the host nation; SYSCON for the remote area is provided by the task force operating under EU command; combined SYSCON is federated and must ensure good QoS for both the urban-based HQs and the remote teams
• Flow of vital services requires close coordination and near real time information sharing among air traffic control, surface transport control, port authorities, customs, immigration, and other host nation agencies that may be augmented by supporting military organizations; onward movement to the remote area requires coordination of airlift from the host nation airport and from sea based support.
• Near real time weather services are required to support air operations into the remote area
• Competition with international news media for available communications

2. Adversarial Operations (Low Level Military Threat)

 A combination of military and civilian organizations are often needed to intervene in areas where force is needed to halt internal conflict or aggression from neighboring countries.  This is usually in combination with efforts to maintain vital services and to restore infrastructure that has been damaged due to the fighting.  The following are some examples where commercial information technology could be used to support the operation.

 2.1 UN Intervention in Internal Conflict – No Functional National Government 

Central government authority has collapsed, and the area is ruled by warlords who have divided the country into locally autonomous, dictatorial domains.  Vital infrastructure and services have been all but eliminated, and large elements of the population face starvation and disease.  Attempts by the UN and other international relief organizations to help the population have been ineffective due to the actions of the warlords.  The kidnapping and slaying of personnel from several of these international organizations has prompted action by the UN and the Partnership for Peace nations to organize a task force to intervene.

 The objective is to establish several operating bases within the country, with an ability to deploy air and land forces rapidly to any part of the country and to restore vital infrastructure and services.  Interim governmental authority is to be under the supervision of the UN and will be a collaborative, consultative form of government involving the host nation authorities and the major participants in the intervention force.  Collaborative mediation of conflicts will include these organizations and the local warlords.

Civil infrastructure heavily damaged in many areas

• Electrical power generation and distribution are disrupted
• Water and food distribution are severely limited
• Local government and law enforcement is controlled by warlords
• Communication networks exist but are severely fragmented
• International communications gateways are destroyed.

Host nation telecom has no capability to operate remaining assets:

• Standard circuit and data services (e.g. IP networks, SS7, GSM, etc)
• System management and control centers have been destroyed
• Circuit damage impacts orderwire capability
• Air traffic control facilities are not operational

Participating organizations:

• Combined task force comprising maritime elements from several nations.  US Navy provides afloat air operational capability and amphibious landing and logistic support.
• Doctors Without Borders (Medicines San Frontieres) in charge of medical support. US hospital ship assists.
  Red Cross provides assistance with food, shelter, clothing.  NATO forces assist in transportation and logistics
  Multinational intelligence operations are coordinated through the NATO intelligence systems, with various levels of access permitted for non-NATO nations.  Bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing also exists.

Information Technology Challenges:

• Coalition information network for users with various levels of access permission and with varying technology capabilities
• Virtual command post with principal staff distributed in several locations
• Virtual collaboration center with extensions to warlord factions
• Services required for users on the move: including stressing needs for imagery and telemedicine to several locations
• Time critical response to threats, including time critical targeting and ability to support air mobile force deployments
• Unreliable network topology; constantly changing as situation changes
• Overall network management and system control under the authority of the host nation and EU, but most technical capability provided by US and NATO forces
• Local population has significant communications capability, often producing interference with critical relief services
• Warlords have capability to disrupt radio communications and radio navigation services
• Warlords have ability to hack into the unprotected or inadequately protected computers of some non-military members of the coalition
• Area air traffic control relies on airborne surveillance and control platforms linked to ground based command posts and to in-flight aircraft
• Possession of anti-air artillery by warlords requires that all air operations must be managed in a near real time network that includes both the air traffic control elements and the combat aircraft control elements
• Competition with international news media for available communications

2.2 UN Intervention in Cross-Border Conflict

 An aggressor has invaded a border region of its neighbor and established its control of that area.  Its forces are systematically killing elements of the local population that are ethnically different from themselves, with the intent of “cleansing” and annexing that region.  The UN has intervened to stop the genocide and to reestablish control on behalf of the recognized government.  The aggressor force has only light weaponry but is highly mobile and possesses electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities that are nearly equivalent to those of the intervening nations.  Friendly force air superiority is achieved immediately upon intervention and extends to 100 nm inside the territory of the aggressor.

 The immediate objective is to establish military control and stabilization in the area, with a main operating base in the area immediately adjacent to the affected region and with several subordinate operating bases within the conflict area.  A political-military crisis management center is located in the capital city of the host nation and is in overall control of the operation.  The first priority is suppression of the aggressor forces; second priority is provision of vital services and law enforcement; third priority is reestablishment of the recognized government control of the area.  Subsequent objective is to transition control to the recognized government authorities, with the military organizations providing support during the restoration of systems and services.

Civil infrastructure is heavily damaged in the conflict area but is intact elsewhere

• Electrical power generation and distribution are disrupted in areas of fighting
• Infrastructure in other areas is intact but is not scaled to support the needs for information services to the force
• Communications between the area of conflict and the rest of the country have been severed
• Local control centers for information services and other services have been destroyed

Host nation has no capability to operate its assets in the conflict area

• No orderwire capability
• No airspace radar or air traffic control capability 

Participating organizations and capabilities:

• Combined task force comprising elements from several nations.  US Navy provides tactical air capability and amphibious landing and logistic support.  NATO and other supporting nations provide ground forces.  Allied air forces provide airborne reconnaissance and targeting and airlift.  Allied air forces provide land based tactical air and airborne refueling support from neighboring nations within 300 to 400 nm from the conflict area.
• US and NATO AWACS and JSTARS provide continuous surveillance of the conflict area.  UAV operations are controlled from locations 100 miles from the area, near access to SATCOM stations.  Military airborne relays can support communications between major control centers and UAVs and other elements in the combat area.
• Multinational intelligence operations are coordinated through the NATO intelligence systems, with various levels of access permitted for non-NATO nations.  Bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing also exists.

Information Technology Challenges:

• Coalition information network for users with various levels of access permission and with varying technology capabilities
• Services required for users on the move: including stressing needs for imagery and telemedicine to several locations
• Time critical response to threats, including time critical targeting and ability to support air mobile force deployments
• Decision making for all applications of lethal force must be made at the political level of command, coordinated with the UN command, the host nation political authority, and the political authorities of the nations involved in the intended mission.
• Unreliable network topology; constantly changing as situation changes
• Network management and system control is split among several organizations.  In the rear area (outside the combat area), the host nation is in control, and all forces operate their systems within the policy dictates of the host nation.  In the combat area, each nation controls its own resources, generally separated geographically with some degree of overlap.  Federated SYSCON is coordinated under the authority of the host nation and NATO, with strong participation from commercial TELCOM providers in the region.
• Local population has significant communications capability, often producing interference with critical relief services
• Aggressor has strong capability to disrupt radio communications and radio navigation services, including sophisticated radio electromagnetic combat organizations with “cold war era” tactical equipment.
• Aggressor and its supporters have very sophisticated ability to hack into the unprotected or inadequately protected computers of some non-military members of the coalition and to intrude into commercial switching, routing, and SYSCON
• Airspace control relies on airborne surveillance and control platforms linked to ground based air traffic control and military command posts and to in-flight aircraft, including fighter aircraft
• Aggressor anti-air artillery requires that all friendly air operations within 100 km of the aggressor’s border must be supported by a near real time network that provides warning and also provides targeting and control information for defense suppression aircraft.  This network must be protected from enemy radio electromagnetic capabilities and must be sufficiently secure to prevent enemy interference, jamming, and intrusion.
• Competition with international news media for available communications

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